Conflict Prevention
Security and Conflict
Is there any evidence that it is possible to analyse pre-conflict situations with enough accuracy so as to inform conflict prevention strategies?
Introduction: Background and Costs of Conflict
One of the most important priorities of policy makes today is the idea that conflicts can be prevented or mitigated before they escalate beyond control. The aim is to reduce the impact and consequences of armed conflict by identifying and then tackling them before they can explode into full escalation. This has a direct effect on eliminating the costs associated with such a conflict. New conflicts are a real threat in today’s climate. Tensions over nuclear weapons in Iran, Pakistan and North Korea and an increased competition for natural resources are potential explosive issues. The aim of this essay is first to introduce and explain the cost benefit of conflict prevention. A closer examination of early warning systems and their success is provided. This is concluded with a closer look at the preventative diplomacy of the European Union since its conception. A brief case study on the EU’s success in Macedonia is provided.
Governments and International bodies aim to prevent future conflict, avoiding damaging human and financial implications. In particular Collier has outlined “military and civilian deaths, disease, physical destruction, population displacement, high military expenditure, capital outflows, policy and political breakdown, psychological trauma and landmines. The rest of the world suffers as a result due to outflows of refuges, implementing humanitarian aid and undertaking expensive peacekeeping operations (Collier 2003). From a policy makes perspective the potential costs of such conflict make the idea of conflict prevention particularly attractive. In financial terms the costs of preventing a conflict outweigh the costs of allowing it to take place and dealing with the aftermath. Reducing the human cost of such violent encounters is also an important goal of ethical policy makers. A dissenting viewpoint to preventing conflicts is Zartmans (2001) notion of ‘ripeness’. It is argued that if a conflict is not allowed to reach a certain mutually hurting stalemate then grievances will continue to fester on both sides. Such a stance would directly undermine the fundamental aspects of a pre-emptive conflict prevention policy. At the core of this argument is whether conflict prevention in the long run may fail to resolve the grievance that is attempting to bubble to the surface, albeit violently.
Armed conflict has been on the decline since the end of the Cold War due in part to an ‘extraordinary upsurge of activism by the international community that has been direct to conflict prevention, peacemaking and peace building’ (Human Security Report 2005 p. 155) The idea of conflict prevention has come into vogue, buzzwords such as conflict prevention, preventative diplomacy and crisis prevention are used more often by governments and NGO’s. United Nations General Hammersskjold coined ‘preventative diplomacy’ in 1960 but was focused on proxy wars exploding into global conflicts between superpowers. The focus today is on consolidating areas of control and from an EU perspective, maintaining secure borders safe from internal threats.
Conflict Prevention Strategies and their Conception
Adelman (1998) outlines two historical backgrounds for use of early warning as a concept. The first is to be found in the intelligence community, early warning related to one party having advanced notification of a threat from a rival party. The second was in dealing with humanitarian disasters, a response to earthquakes, weather and famine. The former early warning system was designed to deal with threats from an enemy threat while the latter attempted to mitigate the suffering of others. The United Nations has quickly developed a system of early warning for conflicts involving both humanitarian and intelligence based concepts. Adelman (1998. p45) states ‘In the UN system, early warning was initially associated with the first type and traditional intelligence gathering to detect ,deter, prevent or counter hostile acts against UN peace keepers in the Congo. The roots of its contemporary conception, however, are to be found in the humanitarian area’. This was in response to concerns about mass migrations of people and the pressure this would put on destabilised states. As a result an early warning system was created within the UN to deal with the push and pull factors of migration. This later developed into a global watch with an aim to assist in preventative diplomacy. The goal was to anticipate humanitarian disasters and have methods in place to deal with flows of refugees. The failure of the UN to deal with the Rwanda disaster has led to recognition that these groups must have an ‘international intelligence analysis capability’ (Adelman, p. 46) This failure led to the UN creating the Policy Analysis Team in the Department of Political Affairs to strengthen the early warning method. This intelligence led development has coincided with a concrete early warning programme for humanitarian disasters by The Department of Humanitarian Affairs. The department is responsible for RefugeeNet as a tool for humanitarian early warning. States have also attempt at trying to deal with the issue, for example the CIA funded Minority at Risk project.
NGO’s and academics have also been influential in developing and closely monitoring the crisis hotspots around the globe. The Carnegie Commission, the Council on Foreign Relations in New York and International Alert in London have attempted to apply and develop early warning models to prevent conflicts. Indicator systems developed by academics such as Ted Gurr and Barbara Harff have also attempted to add to the weight of preventative diplomacy. Theoretical models applied by academics such as Gurr have led to the rise of various ‘Watch’ organisations who aim to closely monitor situations as close to real time as possible. For this to happen a wide network of resources are needed and as of yet this has not materialised into a viable short term option. . Adelman (1998 p.48) states ‘long term case study analysis can have little impact on a crisis that seems to be suddenly triggered by the crash of a plane carrying the president of a country (Rwanda) and the need to respond immediately to a conflict which appears to emerge like a volcano without warning’. Indeed such fast moving events stretch the resources of any crisis networks with no real time capability. Some reports provided by groups such as Crisis Watch publish monthly reports when daily or even hourly monitoring of certain conflicts is needed. Without such real time surveillance on the ground surely immediate conflict prevention is not possible. This is the case for situations that flare up out of control like ‘volcanoes’.
Early warning can however start at a much earlier stage and looking for accelerators as outlined by Ted Gurr and Barbara Harff (1998) seems key to developing policy. ‘Monitoring of accelerators and de-accelerators in potential crisis situations provides a link between risk assessments based on structural models and early warnings of use to national and international policy makers’ (1998 p.551) Caught at an early stage and monitored closely an early warning system could help to provide states and the UN to develop policies to prevent conflict. Gurr and Harff (1998 p. 551) define their concept of triggers, ‘Accelerators are variables operationalized as events that typically increase the level or significance of the most volatile of the background and intervening conditions; more often they develop a momentum of their own capable of escalating a crisis’ These accelerators are examined in the light of collective incentives, the capacity for action and external opportunities for Ethno-political rebellion. It is argued that they act in unison to rapidly increase the severity of conditions that may lead to genocide. Gurr and Harff (1998 p.563) identified a number of ethnic groups that are likely to rebel in the future, including Albanians in Kosovo, Kurds in Iran and the East Timorese. It is argued that ‘An early warning model ideally would provide forecasts of impending conflicts with a high degree of certainty’ (1998. p. 569) While this is the ideal situation the push towards real time monitoring is expensive and difficult to implement with any great accuracy. The model outlined by Gurr and Harff is applied to the Genocide in Rwanda that began in April 1994 and to which international policy makers failed to act. Eight accelerators are monitored in a statistical manner and show a sharp increase in triggers leading up to the outbreak of violence. The accelerator variables are greatly outstripped by the de-accelerators indicating that conflict was imminent. The eight indicators
‘Analysis of (the above) specific categories of accelerators suggests that violent action in Burundi increasingly affected activities of Tutsis in Rwanda. In addition cohesion among Tutsis increased in February. The assassination of prominent leaders six weeks prior to April led to violent clashes between Hutus and Tutsis. One month prior to the onset of genocide, external support decreased. Last minute mediation efforts failed and 11 Belgian peacekeepers were killed’ (Gurr and Harff, 1998. p. 571)
On the basis of this evidence policy makers at the UN or state level should have been able to predict that conflict was imminent. The value of such monitoring would allow policy makers to adopt and put into place conflict prevention strategies. Their needs to be a political will to act in such situations and ‘watch’ groups must have real time monitoring and be taken seriously. For policy makers to act the warnings must be credible enough that preventative action can be taken. These warnings must be ‘early enough to allow time for planning and implementing’. A mistake about such impending conflict can be damaging to the will of states and policy makers to act in the future. There are European examples of success in Macedonia and the Baltic States that show early earning can led to successful conflict prevention. Gurr and Harff finally state that ‘we fully expect that future research will include monitoring of real time situations of impending crisis’ (1998 p. 573) Real time monitoring of situations appears to be the best but most costly way forward for conflict prevention. Policy makers can only act on a reliable and steadfast system of intelligence that provides them with up to date information
European Union
It could be said that the European Union project is a conflict prevention strategy at its heart. After two destructive world wars the countries of Europe had incurred many of the costs outlined by Collier and were unwilling to risk this for future generations. This led to the development of the European Union as a political block and allowed it to develop conflict prevention strategies for states within its own borders. The failure of the European Union to deal with the break up of Yugoslavia seriously damaged its reputation and conflict prevention polices. However out of the ashes came a new determination for policy makers to pursue conflict prevention strategies. The Amsterdam Treaty in 1997 provides for an early warning capability bolstered by further commitments in the Nice treaty in 2003. Cameron (2006 p. 9) describes ‘The Helsinki Headline Goals (adopted in December 1999) aimed to ensure that the EU could put 60,000 troops into the field within 30 days, essentially for peacekeeping purposes, and to maintain them for a year’. This is a serious commitment to conflict prevention strategy by policy makers. Early evidence suggests that the EU was successful in a number of early conflict prevention strategies. In Eastern Europe policy makers successfully implemented a Stability Pact to deal with ‘minority and border disputes’ (2006. p. 9) in the region. Cameron (2006) further explains how the resulting aid package cost around 100 million euro’s but was highly successful in resettling 60,000 displaced citizens. This reintegration of refugees into a multi ethnic community shows how successful early warning can be if it is applied in a methodical and well planned strategy. In an escalating dispute between Hungry and Slovakia over the construction of the Gabcikova dam, the EU successfully mediated before sanctions were applied by either side. Hostilities in Africa and Cyprus in particular have also benefitted from an EU early warning system implemented by policy makers. As a result of this success the EU has consolidated its preventative diplomacy and aims to set ‘clear political priorities for preventative actions’ (2006 p. 10). It is also essential that the EU develops its intelligence gathering in conjunction with a humanitarian aid program. An early warning system needs clear goals in tandem with a real time monitoring of potentially explosive situations. The use of accelerators is an example of how to monitor these situations in an early warning strategy.
Macedonia: A Brief case study
In 1991 Macedonia gained independence from Yugoslavia, immediately the country was involved in a dispute with Greece who failed to recognise its legitimacy. The EU fully recognised the name Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and to this day tension exists over the naming of the state. In 2001 ethnic Albanians who make up roughly 25% of the population demanded moiré representation in the constitution and more power in government. Later in the year the Albanian National Liberation Army (NLA) attacked government forces and the insurgency began to spread. By August 2001 Javier Solana had managed to negotiate an agreement between the warring factions that resulted in legislative and constitutional changes. A NATO peacekeeping force was replaced by an EU force comprised of 400 troops from 26 countries. This was later downscaled to 30 personnel who provided policing support and advice to the Macedonian government. Following the immediate physical conflict prevention financial aid followed totalling 76 million euro’s. Cameron (2006. p.11) describes ‘The Indicative Programme for EU assistance to the country for 2005-2006 focuses on strengthening the country’s administrative capacity, with particular emphasis on the rule of law, economic development – improving the business environment and supporting small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) – and strengthening social cohesion’ Such a policy will prevent accelerators from increasing and leading towards conflict between parties on the basis of their grievances. The EU played an important role in preventing conflict in Macedonia and then supporting the country towards solid social cohesion which represents ethnic Albanians.
Conclusion
Early warning is as the forefront of policy maker’s minds in today’s climate. The idea of conflict prevention is in vogue and successful implementation of these strategies can lead to successful peaceful outcomes. Letting situations slide such as what happened in Rwanda in 1994 leads to the horrific costs outlined by the work of Collier (2003). In the short term the accelerators used in the work of Ted Gurr and Barbara Harff (1998) can provide an excellent indicator of escalating violent conflict. However these methods must be applied successfully in the short term to see what long term effects and accuracy is provided by such theory. Real time analysis and on the ground intelligence I would suggest is the way forward for policy makers looking to implement conflict prevention strategies. A solid strategy as applied by the EU in Macedonia shows that conflict prevention policy makers can implement successful early warning systems.
Bibliography
Adelman, Howard. 1996. Humanitarian and Conflict-orientated Early Warning: A Historical Background Sketch. Early Warning and Conflict Prevention: edited by Klass Van Walraven. Netherland Institute of International Relations
Cameron, Frasier and Rosa Balfour. 2006. The European Neighbourhood Policy as a Conflict Prevention Tool, European policy centre: Conflict Prevention Partnership Publication
Collier, Paul. 2003. Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy. Washington, DC: World Bank
Gurr, Ted and Barabara Harff. 1998. Systematic Early Warning of Humanitarian Emergencies: Journal of Peace Research
Human Security Centre. 2006. Human Security Brief. New York, NY and Oxford, England: Oxford University Press
Lund, Michael S.2009. Conflict Prevention: Theory in Pursuit of Policy and Practice. The SAGE handbook of Conflict Resolution. Sage Publications 2009. London
Stedman, John. 1995. Alchemy for a New World Order: Overselling ‘Preventative Diplomacy’. Foreign Affairs Volume 74 No.3
Zartman, William. 2001. The Timing of Peace Initiatives: Hurting Stalemates and Ripe Moments. The global Review of Ethnopolitics Volume 1, no. 1
Is there any evidence that it is possible to analyse pre-conflict situations with enough accuracy so as to inform conflict prevention strategies?
Introduction: Background and Costs of Conflict
One of the most important priorities of policy makes today is the idea that conflicts can be prevented or mitigated before they escalate beyond control. The aim is to reduce the impact and consequences of armed conflict by identifying and then tackling them before they can explode into full escalation. This has a direct effect on eliminating the costs associated with such a conflict. New conflicts are a real threat in today’s climate. Tensions over nuclear weapons in Iran, Pakistan and North Korea and an increased competition for natural resources are potential explosive issues. The aim of this essay is first to introduce and explain the cost benefit of conflict prevention. A closer examination of early warning systems and their success is provided. This is concluded with a closer look at the preventative diplomacy of the European Union since its conception. A brief case study on the EU’s success in Macedonia is provided.
Governments and International bodies aim to prevent future conflict, avoiding damaging human and financial implications. In particular Collier has outlined “military and civilian deaths, disease, physical destruction, population displacement, high military expenditure, capital outflows, policy and political breakdown, psychological trauma and landmines. The rest of the world suffers as a result due to outflows of refuges, implementing humanitarian aid and undertaking expensive peacekeeping operations (Collier 2003). From a policy makes perspective the potential costs of such conflict make the idea of conflict prevention particularly attractive. In financial terms the costs of preventing a conflict outweigh the costs of allowing it to take place and dealing with the aftermath. Reducing the human cost of such violent encounters is also an important goal of ethical policy makers. A dissenting viewpoint to preventing conflicts is Zartmans (2001) notion of ‘ripeness’. It is argued that if a conflict is not allowed to reach a certain mutually hurting stalemate then grievances will continue to fester on both sides. Such a stance would directly undermine the fundamental aspects of a pre-emptive conflict prevention policy. At the core of this argument is whether conflict prevention in the long run may fail to resolve the grievance that is attempting to bubble to the surface, albeit violently.
Armed conflict has been on the decline since the end of the Cold War due in part to an ‘extraordinary upsurge of activism by the international community that has been direct to conflict prevention, peacemaking and peace building’ (Human Security Report 2005 p. 155) The idea of conflict prevention has come into vogue, buzzwords such as conflict prevention, preventative diplomacy and crisis prevention are used more often by governments and NGO’s. United Nations General Hammersskjold coined ‘preventative diplomacy’ in 1960 but was focused on proxy wars exploding into global conflicts between superpowers. The focus today is on consolidating areas of control and from an EU perspective, maintaining secure borders safe from internal threats.
Conflict Prevention Strategies and their Conception
Adelman (1998) outlines two historical backgrounds for use of early warning as a concept. The first is to be found in the intelligence community, early warning related to one party having advanced notification of a threat from a rival party. The second was in dealing with humanitarian disasters, a response to earthquakes, weather and famine. The former early warning system was designed to deal with threats from an enemy threat while the latter attempted to mitigate the suffering of others. The United Nations has quickly developed a system of early warning for conflicts involving both humanitarian and intelligence based concepts. Adelman (1998. p45) states ‘In the UN system, early warning was initially associated with the first type and traditional intelligence gathering to detect ,deter, prevent or counter hostile acts against UN peace keepers in the Congo. The roots of its contemporary conception, however, are to be found in the humanitarian area’. This was in response to concerns about mass migrations of people and the pressure this would put on destabilised states. As a result an early warning system was created within the UN to deal with the push and pull factors of migration. This later developed into a global watch with an aim to assist in preventative diplomacy. The goal was to anticipate humanitarian disasters and have methods in place to deal with flows of refugees. The failure of the UN to deal with the Rwanda disaster has led to recognition that these groups must have an ‘international intelligence analysis capability’ (Adelman, p. 46) This failure led to the UN creating the Policy Analysis Team in the Department of Political Affairs to strengthen the early warning method. This intelligence led development has coincided with a concrete early warning programme for humanitarian disasters by The Department of Humanitarian Affairs. The department is responsible for RefugeeNet as a tool for humanitarian early warning. States have also attempt at trying to deal with the issue, for example the CIA funded Minority at Risk project.
NGO’s and academics have also been influential in developing and closely monitoring the crisis hotspots around the globe. The Carnegie Commission, the Council on Foreign Relations in New York and International Alert in London have attempted to apply and develop early warning models to prevent conflicts. Indicator systems developed by academics such as Ted Gurr and Barbara Harff have also attempted to add to the weight of preventative diplomacy. Theoretical models applied by academics such as Gurr have led to the rise of various ‘Watch’ organisations who aim to closely monitor situations as close to real time as possible. For this to happen a wide network of resources are needed and as of yet this has not materialised into a viable short term option. . Adelman (1998 p.48) states ‘long term case study analysis can have little impact on a crisis that seems to be suddenly triggered by the crash of a plane carrying the president of a country (Rwanda) and the need to respond immediately to a conflict which appears to emerge like a volcano without warning’. Indeed such fast moving events stretch the resources of any crisis networks with no real time capability. Some reports provided by groups such as Crisis Watch publish monthly reports when daily or even hourly monitoring of certain conflicts is needed. Without such real time surveillance on the ground surely immediate conflict prevention is not possible. This is the case for situations that flare up out of control like ‘volcanoes’.
Early warning can however start at a much earlier stage and looking for accelerators as outlined by Ted Gurr and Barbara Harff (1998) seems key to developing policy. ‘Monitoring of accelerators and de-accelerators in potential crisis situations provides a link between risk assessments based on structural models and early warnings of use to national and international policy makers’ (1998 p.551) Caught at an early stage and monitored closely an early warning system could help to provide states and the UN to develop policies to prevent conflict. Gurr and Harff (1998 p. 551) define their concept of triggers, ‘Accelerators are variables operationalized as events that typically increase the level or significance of the most volatile of the background and intervening conditions; more often they develop a momentum of their own capable of escalating a crisis’ These accelerators are examined in the light of collective incentives, the capacity for action and external opportunities for Ethno-political rebellion. It is argued that they act in unison to rapidly increase the severity of conditions that may lead to genocide. Gurr and Harff (1998 p.563) identified a number of ethnic groups that are likely to rebel in the future, including Albanians in Kosovo, Kurds in Iran and the East Timorese. It is argued that ‘An early warning model ideally would provide forecasts of impending conflicts with a high degree of certainty’ (1998. p. 569) While this is the ideal situation the push towards real time monitoring is expensive and difficult to implement with any great accuracy. The model outlined by Gurr and Harff is applied to the Genocide in Rwanda that began in April 1994 and to which international policy makers failed to act. Eight accelerators are monitored in a statistical manner and show a sharp increase in triggers leading up to the outbreak of violence. The accelerator variables are greatly outstripped by the de-accelerators indicating that conflict was imminent. The eight indicators
- Life
integrity violations by government
- Physical
or verbal clashes between regime and targeted groups
- Aggressive
posturing or actions by opposition groups
- Increase
in size or degree of cohesion in opposition groups
- Threats
of external involvement against government elites
- Increase
in external support for politically active groups
- Occurrence
of violent opposition by kindred groups in neighbouring countries
- (Gurr
and Harff 1998 p. 571)
‘Analysis of (the above) specific categories of accelerators suggests that violent action in Burundi increasingly affected activities of Tutsis in Rwanda. In addition cohesion among Tutsis increased in February. The assassination of prominent leaders six weeks prior to April led to violent clashes between Hutus and Tutsis. One month prior to the onset of genocide, external support decreased. Last minute mediation efforts failed and 11 Belgian peacekeepers were killed’ (Gurr and Harff, 1998. p. 571)
On the basis of this evidence policy makers at the UN or state level should have been able to predict that conflict was imminent. The value of such monitoring would allow policy makers to adopt and put into place conflict prevention strategies. Their needs to be a political will to act in such situations and ‘watch’ groups must have real time monitoring and be taken seriously. For policy makers to act the warnings must be credible enough that preventative action can be taken. These warnings must be ‘early enough to allow time for planning and implementing’. A mistake about such impending conflict can be damaging to the will of states and policy makers to act in the future. There are European examples of success in Macedonia and the Baltic States that show early earning can led to successful conflict prevention. Gurr and Harff finally state that ‘we fully expect that future research will include monitoring of real time situations of impending crisis’ (1998 p. 573) Real time monitoring of situations appears to be the best but most costly way forward for conflict prevention. Policy makers can only act on a reliable and steadfast system of intelligence that provides them with up to date information
European Union
It could be said that the European Union project is a conflict prevention strategy at its heart. After two destructive world wars the countries of Europe had incurred many of the costs outlined by Collier and were unwilling to risk this for future generations. This led to the development of the European Union as a political block and allowed it to develop conflict prevention strategies for states within its own borders. The failure of the European Union to deal with the break up of Yugoslavia seriously damaged its reputation and conflict prevention polices. However out of the ashes came a new determination for policy makers to pursue conflict prevention strategies. The Amsterdam Treaty in 1997 provides for an early warning capability bolstered by further commitments in the Nice treaty in 2003. Cameron (2006 p. 9) describes ‘The Helsinki Headline Goals (adopted in December 1999) aimed to ensure that the EU could put 60,000 troops into the field within 30 days, essentially for peacekeeping purposes, and to maintain them for a year’. This is a serious commitment to conflict prevention strategy by policy makers. Early evidence suggests that the EU was successful in a number of early conflict prevention strategies. In Eastern Europe policy makers successfully implemented a Stability Pact to deal with ‘minority and border disputes’ (2006. p. 9) in the region. Cameron (2006) further explains how the resulting aid package cost around 100 million euro’s but was highly successful in resettling 60,000 displaced citizens. This reintegration of refugees into a multi ethnic community shows how successful early warning can be if it is applied in a methodical and well planned strategy. In an escalating dispute between Hungry and Slovakia over the construction of the Gabcikova dam, the EU successfully mediated before sanctions were applied by either side. Hostilities in Africa and Cyprus in particular have also benefitted from an EU early warning system implemented by policy makers. As a result of this success the EU has consolidated its preventative diplomacy and aims to set ‘clear political priorities for preventative actions’ (2006 p. 10). It is also essential that the EU develops its intelligence gathering in conjunction with a humanitarian aid program. An early warning system needs clear goals in tandem with a real time monitoring of potentially explosive situations. The use of accelerators is an example of how to monitor these situations in an early warning strategy.
Macedonia: A Brief case study
In 1991 Macedonia gained independence from Yugoslavia, immediately the country was involved in a dispute with Greece who failed to recognise its legitimacy. The EU fully recognised the name Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and to this day tension exists over the naming of the state. In 2001 ethnic Albanians who make up roughly 25% of the population demanded moiré representation in the constitution and more power in government. Later in the year the Albanian National Liberation Army (NLA) attacked government forces and the insurgency began to spread. By August 2001 Javier Solana had managed to negotiate an agreement between the warring factions that resulted in legislative and constitutional changes. A NATO peacekeeping force was replaced by an EU force comprised of 400 troops from 26 countries. This was later downscaled to 30 personnel who provided policing support and advice to the Macedonian government. Following the immediate physical conflict prevention financial aid followed totalling 76 million euro’s. Cameron (2006. p.11) describes ‘The Indicative Programme for EU assistance to the country for 2005-2006 focuses on strengthening the country’s administrative capacity, with particular emphasis on the rule of law, economic development – improving the business environment and supporting small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) – and strengthening social cohesion’ Such a policy will prevent accelerators from increasing and leading towards conflict between parties on the basis of their grievances. The EU played an important role in preventing conflict in Macedonia and then supporting the country towards solid social cohesion which represents ethnic Albanians.
Conclusion
Early warning is as the forefront of policy maker’s minds in today’s climate. The idea of conflict prevention is in vogue and successful implementation of these strategies can lead to successful peaceful outcomes. Letting situations slide such as what happened in Rwanda in 1994 leads to the horrific costs outlined by the work of Collier (2003). In the short term the accelerators used in the work of Ted Gurr and Barbara Harff (1998) can provide an excellent indicator of escalating violent conflict. However these methods must be applied successfully in the short term to see what long term effects and accuracy is provided by such theory. Real time analysis and on the ground intelligence I would suggest is the way forward for policy makers looking to implement conflict prevention strategies. A solid strategy as applied by the EU in Macedonia shows that conflict prevention policy makers can implement successful early warning systems.
Bibliography
Adelman, Howard. 1996. Humanitarian and Conflict-orientated Early Warning: A Historical Background Sketch. Early Warning and Conflict Prevention: edited by Klass Van Walraven. Netherland Institute of International Relations
Cameron, Frasier and Rosa Balfour. 2006. The European Neighbourhood Policy as a Conflict Prevention Tool, European policy centre: Conflict Prevention Partnership Publication
Collier, Paul. 2003. Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy. Washington, DC: World Bank
Gurr, Ted and Barabara Harff. 1998. Systematic Early Warning of Humanitarian Emergencies: Journal of Peace Research
Human Security Centre. 2006. Human Security Brief. New York, NY and Oxford, England: Oxford University Press
Lund, Michael S.2009. Conflict Prevention: Theory in Pursuit of Policy and Practice. The SAGE handbook of Conflict Resolution. Sage Publications 2009. London
Stedman, John. 1995. Alchemy for a New World Order: Overselling ‘Preventative Diplomacy’. Foreign Affairs Volume 74 No.3
Zartman, William. 2001. The Timing of Peace Initiatives: Hurting Stalemates and Ripe Moments. The global Review of Ethnopolitics Volume 1, no. 1
